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I enjoyed the exchange on my article providing a qualified constitutional defense of
Opinion 2/13. I will not delve into a point-by-point rebuttal of the critics here. Instead,
I shall make three quick points and end with a methodological challenge in the
interest of moving forward.
Mind the quotation marks
The title of my longer article is intended as an allusion to, and implicit critique of,
Opinion 2/13’s unrelenting style – not an endorsement thereof. Hence the quotation
marks surrounding the provocative phrase. The invocation of modesty, in turn, is an
appeal to turn down the heat and focus more calmly on the substance (even though
that may include some rather large claims). It will not help the EU, the ECHR, or the
cause of human rights to adopt the quoted style of discourse without the quotation
marks.
Human Rights ≠ Human Rights Regimes
Commentators are right to be concerned about human rights. But we must
distinguish between human rights and human rights regimes. The ECHR is a
particular human rights regime with a particular institutional structure that has its
strengths and weaknesses. (The EU, as a constitutional regime of governance, has
its strengths and weaknesses, too.) Just as constitutional law must be understood
as mediated by the institutional reality and context in which it operates, so, too,
the cause of human rights alone does not justify the extension of any given human
rights regime. When the EU’s commitment to human rights is furthered by joining a
particular human rights regime, it should be done in a manner consistent with the
EU’s core constitutional architecture.
“Monism” versus “Dualism”
Several commentators invoke this idea to suggest there is no problem with
Strasbourg deciding questions of responsibility or resolving inter-state disputes as
a matter of Convention law. As an initial matter, I confess these issues strike me as
rather small stuff no matter what side you’re on (I only devote a handful of my 50
pages to this). Indeed, there was no hue and cry about the co-respondent and Article
33 issues when the AG came out with her opinion, which essentially said the same
thing as the Court does now.
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In any event, dualism may indeed be a shield against the intrusion of an international
jurisdiction into ones own internal affairs. I agree with that. And yet, the existence
of that shield does not mean there are no constitutional objections to subjecting
any and all internal legal decisions to an external (dualist) check. By signing on to
the ECHR, the EU is signing on to a limited treaty to ensure against human rights
violations, not to ensure against an improper division of competences among the
Member States and the EU, or to provide an additional external mechanism for inter-
state disputes that ought to be resolved by EU procedures.
Germany would not expressly allow Strasbourg to pronounce, even only as a matter
of international law, on the division of powers between the Bund and the Länder.
Nor would Germany allow one Land to sue another before an international tribunal.
The same is true for any other federal state. To be sure, the EU is not a state,
and the Member States have separate international legal personality. And yet, the
division of competences between the EU and its Member States, as well as suits
among Member States on questions of EU law, are internal matters governed by
EU constitutional law much as the internal division of competences among the Bund
and the Länder, or suits among the Länder, are governed by German constitutional
law. There may be some pluralist wiggle room at the margins in the EU, as I carefully
explain in my larger piece, but a simple doctrinal invocation of dualism does not do
justice to these concerns.
The Challenge: Plural Constitutionalism as Theory
and as Interpretive Method
If there is a theme running through my disagreement with the current critics, it’s
about method. When arguing about the Union, one question I often get asked is
why we should care about whether we think of the Union in constitutional or, say,
administrative law terms. If the current discussion on this blog has proven nothing
else, it has proven that this choice matters deeply.
As I have argued in connection with the Kadi case, we see a dramatic change
in approach there from the CFI’s international view of the Union to the ECJ’s
constitutional view. Constitutionalism as an approach to the Union certainly made
a difference. Elsewhere, I systematically traced the Court’s interpretive stance of
constitutionalism through the caselaw more generally. The same basic point proves
central to this discussion as well.
Constitutionalism, for instance, answers some of the questions about autonomy.
The autonomy of EU law is the autonomy of a constitutional system that does not
depend for its legality on another system of law. The constitutional autonomy of
EU law means that the EU ultimately controls is own law and its own processes of
adjudication. Pluralism may enter the picture (as I argue it does) in that the EU’s
constitution is open to certain claims of legal authority from the outside, but only as
long as those claims also make sense from the EU’s internal point of view.
Plural constitutionalism is complicated business, not least because it demands
appreciating and reconstructing in unconventional ways the rudimentary demands
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of constitutionalism. These demands become especially intricate in federal-
type systems. And this is just what I sought to do in my piece. Among the most
challenging aspects (less discussed in the blog responses) were, first, to uncover
the explosive tension between internal mutual trust and external human rights
obligations and, second, to show how this tension can be diffused not by an
exemption but by closing the third leg of the triangle between the Member States, the
EU, and the ECHR.   Another challenge was to uncover the “consolidating function”
of domestic high courts in constitutional systems, an aspect of their role that only the
EU’s special situation and the problem of accession truly bring into focus.
My analysis, then, requires systematic attention to the institutional aspects of the
constitutional law of the European Union, something that a single-minded focus on
human rights (for all its moral force) tends to obscure. Even where I disagree with
the Court, as in the case of mutual trust, for instance, I do not disagree with the
Court’s fundamental constitutional approach to the problem. That is why I termed my
piece a modest “defense” of the Court. To be sure, I disagree with the Court’s more
specific constitutional analysis and its proposed solution on several issues. But I take
the Court’s constitutional concerns seriously, as well we should.
Let us, then, debate the Court’s opinion on those terms, i.e. on the terms of the
(plural) constitutional law of the European Union for which accession must make
sense. We may still disagree, but we will get far closer to where we ultimately need
to be in moving accession forward.
Finally, in the grand debates about Europe, all this shows, once again, that
constitutionalism is not just a rarified theory of the Union. And it’s not just a collection
of legal rules. Constitutionalism deeply grounds an approach to the Union, and a
corresponding method of interpretation. That method, in turn, reflects an important
legal, social, and institutional reality of the European Union as we have it today.
Indeed, to my mind, Opinion 2/13 is just the latest indication of its existence. And if
you think that’s somewhat circular, or just the beginning of a self-fulfilling prophesy,
then welcome to constitutional law!
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